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DEFINING "DISABILITY" UNDER THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),I enacted in 1990, 
seeks to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities2 
in the areas of employment,3 public services,4 public transportation,S 
public accommodations,6 and telecommunications. 7 In order to come 
under the protection of the ADA, an individual must satisfy the 
definition of disability developed in the statute and clarified by the 
federal regulations, including those promulgated by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").8 The ADA's defini-
tion of "disability" is nearly identical to the definition of "individual 
with handicaps"9 contained in the amended Federal Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act").JO Furthermore, Congress has 
indicated that the relevant case law interpreting the Rehabilitation 
Act should generally be applied to interpret the term disability under 
the ADA.II 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1993). 
2. [d. § 12101 (b). 
3. [d. §§ 12111-12117. 
4. [d. §§ 12131-12134. 
5. [d. §§ 12141-12165. 
6. [d. §§ 12181-12189. 
7. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1993). 
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-(1) (1993). 
9. Congress' change of terminology from individual with handicaps to disability 
"represents an effort ... to make use of up-to-date, currently accepted 
terminology." S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989). 
10. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). The original definition of individual with hand-
icaps under the Rehabilitation Act did not contain the third prong of the ADA 
definition-"is regarded as having such an impairment." See S. REp. No. 
1297. 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 37-39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 
6388-90. In 1974 Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to include this 
language to "clarif[y) the intention to include those persons who are discrim-
inated against on the basis of handicap, whether or not they are in fact 
handicapped." [d. at 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6389. This 
subsection includes "those persons who do not in fact have the condition which 
they are perceived as having. as well as those persons whose mental or physical 
condition does not substantially limit their life activities and who thus are not 
technically within [the first prong) in the new definition." [d. at 39, reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6389-90. 
11. H.R. REp. No. 485. 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, 50 (1990). reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-66; H.R. REp. No. 485. 101st Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 
III, 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-54; S. REp. No. 116, 
supra note 9 at 21; EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,740 (1991). 
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To comprehend the meaning of the term disability under the 
ADA, one must understand the relationship between the ADA, the 
applicable regulations, and prior decisions. Consequently, section II 
of this Comment first examines the ADA's definition of disability 
and the relevant EEOC regulations. Second, section III discusses the 
relationship between the ADA's definition of disability and the 
Rehabilitation Act's definition of individual with handicaps. Third, 
section IV reviews the Rehabilitation Act decisions. Finally, section 
V analyzes the ADA's definition against the background of the EEOC 
regulations and the Rehabilitation Act decisions. . 
II. THE ADA'S DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
Historically, society has isolated and segregated individuals with 
disabilities. Discrimination still persists in "critical areas, such as 
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transpor-
tation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health serv-
ices, voting and access to public services." 12 The ADA was enacted 
to eliminate these types of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities. 13 
In order to come under the protection of the ADA, an individual 
must first demonstrate that he has a disability. 14 The ADA's definition 
of disability consists of three prongs: "(A) [A] physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such impairment. "IS The term disability 
also includes "a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV)."16 The ADA, however, specifically excludes certain 
conditions from the definition of disability, 17 including transvestism, 18 
current illegal drug use,19 homosexuality, and bisexuality.20 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1993). 
13. [d. § 12101(b). . 
14. [d. § 12112(a). Title I provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual." [d. 
15. [d. § 12102(2). The ADA's three prong test is based upon the three prong test 
as defined in the Rehabilitation Act. See infra part III. 
16. H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II, supra note 11, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 334. Congress explained that a person infected with HIV is covered under 
the first prong of the definition of the term disability because of the substantial 
limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relationships that exists as a result 
of being infected with HIV. [d. 
17. Disability does not include "(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, ex-
hibitionism, voyeurism, gender identification disorders not resulting from phys-
ical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; (2) compulsive gambling, 
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Title I of the ADA requires that the EEOC issue substantive 
regulations to implement the employment section of the ADA.21 
Among other objectives, the Title I regulations seek to clarify the 
meaning of disability, by defining terms of art used in the statute, 
such as "physical or mental impairment, "22 "major life activities, "23 
"substantially limits,"24 "has a record of such impairment,"2S and 
"is regarded as having such an impairment. "26 
kleptomania, or pyromania; or (3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting 
from current illegal use of drugs." 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b). 
18. [d. § 12208. 
19. [d. §§ 12114, 12210. 
20. [d. § 12211(a). 
21. [d. § 12116. 
22. The EEOC has defined physical or mental impairment as 
I) any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, 
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body 
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respira-
tory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, 
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or 
2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, 
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific 
learning disabilities. . 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1992). 
23. According to the EEOC, major life actIvItIes include "[c]aring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The EEOC Interpretive Guidelines 
include within this term "those basic activities that the average person in the 
general population can perform with little or no difficulty," and it warns that 
the above list is not exhaustive. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,741 (1991). Other 
major life activities include sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching. 29 C.F.R. 
1630.2(i). 
24. Title I regulations define substantially limits as being 
(1) ... (i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average 
person in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly 
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an 
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared 
to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person 
in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). According to the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, the 
identification of whether a physical or mental impairment exists is only the 
first step in determining whether or not an individual is disabled. 56 Fed. Reg. 
35,726, 35,741. Only if the impairment rises to the level of the disability, can 
the impairment be said to substantially· limit one or more of the individual's 
major life activities. [d. 
25. Under Title I regulations, has a record of such impairment means that an 
individual "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or 
physical impairment that siIbstantially limits one or more major life activities." 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). 
26. The phrase is regarded as having such an impairment means that an individual 
(1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as consti-
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The regulations also pn;>vide a list of factors to be considered 
in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a 
major life activity. 27 Of particular concern during the rulemaking 
process was the inclusion of the term "working" as one of the major 
life activities. 28 
III. THE REHABILITATION ACT'S DEFINITION OF 
INDIVIDUAL WITH HANDICAPS 
The Rehabilitation Act was enacted, in part, "to prevent dis-
crimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of their 
need for, or ability to benefit from vocational services, in relation 
to federal financial assistance in the areas of employment, housing, 
transportation, education, health services, or any other [f]ederally-
aided programs. "29 Unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act employs 
the term of art, individual with handicaps.3o Individual with handicaps 
is defined as any person "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life 
activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded 
as having such an impairment. "31 As a comparison between the 
definitions of individual with handicaps and disability indicates, the 
tuting such limitation; 
(2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward 
such impairment; or 
(3) [h]as none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(I) or (2) 
of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substan-
tially limiting impairment. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). 
27. Factors to be considered in deciding if an individual is substantially limited in 
a major life activity include "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; 
(ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent 
or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or 
resulting from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2). 
28. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991). To alleviate concerns associated with the inclusion 
of "working," the EEOC provided the following definition: 
With respect to the major life activity of working - (i) The term 
substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to 
perform either a class of jobs of a broad range or jobs in various 
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job 
does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity 
of working. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3). 
29. S. REp. No. 1297, supra note 10, at 37, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6388. 
30. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1988). 
31. [d. 
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Rehabilitation Act is the model upon which the ADA's definition is 
based.32 
IV. FURTHER DEFINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ADA: A 
REVIEW OF THE REHABILITATION ACT DECISIONS 
Following the passage of the Rehabilitation Act, extensive liti-
gation occurred over the meaning of individual with handicaps. As 
the federal courts resolved these various cases, their resulting decisions 
slowly created a more comprehensive definition of individual· with 
handicaps. As a result, federal courts, heeding Congress' directive to 
apply the Rehabilitation Act decisions to ADA cases,33 have a more 
comprehensive framework within which to operate. More signifi-
cantly, however, is the impact this comprehensiveness will have as 
the courts interpret the ADA's definition of disability. As the courts 
rely upon the Rehabilitation Act decisions, the more likely it is that 
future ADA decisions will develop uniformly with less controversy 
over what type of conditions qualify as disabilities. A review of the 
Rehabilitation Act decisions is, therefore, important. 
A. The Leading Decisions 
Three leading federal cases, analyzing the term handicapped 
individual under the Rehabilitation Act, include School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline,34 E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 35 and 
Jasany v. United States Postal Service.36 In Arline, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a teacher, who suffered from a susceptibility 
to tuberculosis, could be classified as a handicapped person within 
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 37 Arline suffered tuberculosis 
in such an acute form that it affected her respiratory system and 
necessitated her being hospitalized.38 Working with the first prong of 
the definition and the regulations, the Court determined that Arline 
had a physical impairment. 39 According to the Court, because Arline 
had been hospitalized for tuberculosis, she could be considered a 
handicapped individual under the second prong of the definition since 
she had a record of impairment.40 
32. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
33. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
34. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
35. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980). 
36. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985). 
37. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline. 480 U.S. 273. 289 (1987). 
38. [d. at 281. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. 
(l 
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In an attempt to justify the discriminatory treatment, the School 
Board argued that tuberculosis is a contagious disease.41 The Court, 
however, rejected this line of reasoning.42 The Court emphasized that 
"[a]llowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a 
physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of 
[the Rehabilitation Act]. "43 . 
The seminal case of E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshalf44 delineated 
the factors-which must be satisfied in order to find that an individual 
is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Crosby, 
a union member, sustained back injuries on the job.4s Subsequently, 
he was referred by the union to E. E. Black, 'Ltd., a general 
construction contractor ("the contractor"), which required all ap-
prentice carpenters to undergo a pre-employment physical examina-
tion.46 The examination revealed "a congenital back anomaly. "47 
Based upon this examination, the contractor refused to hire Crosby.48 
A second physical examination was conducted and revealed additional 
back injuries, specifically a "spina bifida occulta and a mild rotos-
coliosis. "49 The second examining physician concluded that these 
injuries did not prevent Crosby from performing the job of apprentice 
carpenter. so Crosby, however, was never hired by the contractor for 
an apprentice carpenter position. sl 
The E. E. Black court focused upon all three prongs of the 
Rehabilitation Act's handicapped definition.s2 The court emphasized 
that the third prong of the definition "refers to those individuals 
who are perceived as having a handicap, whether an impairment 
41. [d. 
42. [d. at 282. 
43. [d. at 284. The ADA, however, lists as an employer defense that "[t]he term 
'qualification standard' may include a requirement that an individual shall not 
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the work-
place." 42 U .S.C. § 12113(b) (1993). Furthermore, individuals who have an 
infectious or communicable disease which cannot be reasonably accommodated 
may be refused assignment to a job involving food handling. [d. § 121 I3(d)(2). 
For a list of infectious and communicable diseases which are transmitted 
through 'the handling of the food supply see id. § 121 I3(d)(1). 
44. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980). 
45. [d. at 1091. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. "Spina bifida occulta is an anomaly characterized by the defective closure 
of the bony encasement of the spinal cord. Rotoscoliosis is an anomaly which 
involves a narrowing of the disc space caused by a slight rotation of the 
spine." [d. n.l. 
50. [d. at 1091-92. 
51. [d. at 1092. 
52. [d. at 1097. 
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exists or not, but who, because of attitudes or for any other reason, 
are regarded as handicapped by employers. "53 Regarding the second 
prong, the court stated that a "handicapped individual is 'substan-
tially limited' if he or she is likely to experience difficulty in securing, 
retaining or advancing in employment because of a handicap."S4 The 
court then noted that the definitions contained in the Rehabilitation 
Act are "personal and must be evaluated by looking at the particular 
individual .... It is the impaired individual that must be examined, 
and not just the impairment in the abstract. "55 Although an exam-
ining physician had concluded that Crosby's back injuries did not 
prevent him from performing the job's duties, the contractor per-
ceived Crosby as being handicapped.56 Therefore, the court held that 
Crosby was a handicapped individual under the third prong of the 
definition. 57 . 
The importance of Jasany v. United States Postal Service58 stems 
from its analysis rather than from its holding that the physical 
impairment of crossed eyes did not substantially limit a major life 
activity. 59 In Jasany, a distribution clerk trainee, who was born with 
a mild case of strabismus, commonly known as crossed eyes, was 
discharged by the United States Postal Service ("USPS").60 During 
a ninety-day probationary period, Jasany developed eye strain, head-
aches, and excess tearing.61 However, both prior to and after being 
discharged by the USPS, Jasany was able to fully participate in 
"school, work, sports, and recreational activities, as well as all other 
normal daily activities of every kind whatsoever without limitation."62 
The Sixth Circuit held that the district court had "erred as a 
matter of law in finding that [Jasany] was a handicapped person 
within the meaning of [the Re·habilitation Act]. "63 Although the court 
found that Jasany had a physical or mental impairment,64 this im-
pairment did not have any effect on any of his other activities, 
53. Id. at 1097 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 60-741, app. A (1993» (emphasis supplied). 
54. Id. at 1099 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1993». 
55. Id. at 1099. 
56. /d. at 1101-02. 
57. Id. at 1102. For a more thorough analysis of this case see Andrew W. Haines, 
E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of "Handicapped 
Individual" for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and 
for Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16 Loy. L.A. L. 
REv. 527 (1983). 
58. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985). 
59. Id. at 1250. 
60. Id. at 1247. 
61. Id. 
62.ld. 
63. Id. at 1250. 
64. Id. at 1248. 
364 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 22 
including past jobs or other duties he performed at the USPS.65 
B. Other Federal Court Decisions 
1. Musculoskeletal Disabilities or Impairments 
The lower federal courts have analyzed whether musculoskeletal 
disabilities or impairments meet the Rehabilitation Act's definition 
of handicapped with varying results. The United States District Court 
. for the Southern District of New York held that a dislocated shoulder 
was a disability under the Rehabilitation Act in Mahoney v. Ortiz.66 
In Mahoney, a police officer applicant had suffered four or five 
shoulder dislocations prior to taking the New York City Police 
Department written exam.67 After being considered ineligible to be-
come a police officer because of the prior dislocations, he brought 
suit under the Rehabilitation Act.68 
Quoting the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handicapped 
individual, the court held that the applicant was a handicapped 
individual under .the second and third prongs.69 Basing its holding 
on the applicant's potential for "total incapacitation," the court 
reasoned that nearly total incapacitation is a "limitation on one or 
more of [the applicant's] major life activities. "70 According to the 
court, the applicant had established a prima facie case under the 
Rehabilitation Act.71 
Persons impaired because of spinal· deformities, amputation, and 
dwarfism have also been considered handicapped individuals within 
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. In Thornhill v. Marsh,72 
Thornhill, an employee of the Army Corps of Engineers, ("Corps") 
was discharged after a physical examination revealed that he had a 
congenital spinal deformity, preventing him from lifting more than 
fifty pounds.73 The Corps refused to rehire Thornhill even after 
Thornhill's and the Corps~ examining physicians concluded that the 
deformity did not limit his lifting capacity.74 
Focusing on the third prong of the handicapped definition, the 
court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
65. [d. at 1250. 
66. 645 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
67. [d. at 23. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. at 24. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. 
72. 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
73. [d. at 1183. 
74. [d. 
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Thornhill was a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act. 7S 
The court based its reasoning on the Corps' misplaced perception 
that Thornhill's spinal deformity prevented him from performing his 
duties.76 
In Longoria v. Harris,77 the parties did not dispute that an 
individual who had his right leg amputated below the kneecap was 
a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act. 78 
Similarly, in Dexler v. Tisch,79 the government stipulated that a 
USPS applicant with achondroplastic dwarfism, who was denied 
employment as a distribution clerk, was handicapped within the 
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.so The significance of Longoria 
and Dexler stems from their addition of two disorders that can be 
considered as falling under the Rehabilitation Act's definition of 
hat:J,dicapped. 
Inconsistency, however, has occurred when the federal courts 
have considered whether back injuries and deformities satisfy the 
Rehabilitation Act's definition. In Perez v. Philadelphia Housing 
AuthoritY,81 a Pennsylvania State employee was discharged after 
having suffered back and leg injuries on the job.82 Citing both the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices regulations, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania emphasized that determining who is a hand-
icapped person depends on a case-by-case analysis of the facts.83 The 
court then held that Perez had a physical impairment that substan-
tially limited her activities.84 The court based its holding on Perez' 
testimony that her back problems caused her considerable pain, 
affecting not only her work, "but also her ability to walk, sit, stand, 
drive, care for her home and child, and engage in leisure pastimes. "8S 
Therefore, the court concluded that Perez was a handicapped indi-
vidual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 86 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1184. 
77. 554 F. Supp. 102 (s.b. Tex. 1982). 
78. Id. at 102-03. 
79. 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987). 
80. Id. at 1425. "Achondroplastic dwarfism is a growth disorder that affects all 
four extremities and results in short limbs and short stature." Id. at 1419. As . 
a result of this condition, Dexler was four feet, five inches tall and had.a 
vertical reach of 58 112 inches. Id. Furthermore, his horizontal reach was well 
below normal. Id. 
81. 677 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1987), ajj'd, 841 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1988) .. 
82. Id. at 359. 
83. Jd. at 360. 
84.Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 360-61. 
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In Coley v. Secretary oj the Army,87 Coley, a civilian employee' 
of the United States Army, filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act 
when he was denied reinstatement, following a short term disability 
period that involved a chronic back problem. 88 Coley's medical report 
prevented him from lifting or carrying objects in excess of fifteen 
pounds.89 Furthermore, Coley could not work in excessive cold or 
dampness nor could he perform manual labor. 90 
Operating under the first prong of the definition, the court held 
that Coley was a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act 
because he had a physical impairment which substantially limited the 
major life activity of working.91 The court found that Coley's "phys-
ical handicap was a significant barrier to his employment" because 
"[h]e was disqualified from all jobs requiring any degree of manual 
labor."92 Therefore, according to the court, his "physical disability 
was a substantial limitation on his ability to work. "93 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California, in Diaz v. United States Postal Service,94 considered the 
situation where a USPS employee, Diaz, who had suffered a lum-
bosacral strain of his back during the Vietnam War, experienced an 
additional back injury on the job.9s Following his post-injury return 
to the job, Diaz was incapable of performing all the duties required 
of an USPS carrier, including lifting mail bags weighing up to seventy 
pounds.96 After being discharged, Diaz brought suit, alleging that the 
USPS's discrimination against his handicap violated the Rehabilita-
tion Act.97 
In its opinion, the court focused upon the term major life 
activities.98 Through reference to the regulations, the court defined 
major life activities to include "functions, such as caring for one's' 
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working."99 The court then held that the 
impairment had not substantially limited Diaz's major life activities 
since only seven of his sixteen absences had been caused by back-
87. 689 F. Supp. 519 (D. Md. 1987). 
88. [d. at 520. 
89. [d. at 520-21. 
90. [d. at 521. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. 658 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Cal. 1987). 
95. [d. at 488. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 491. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 491 (quoting Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1248 
(6th Cir. 1985». 
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related problems. loo The court further bolstered its holding with the 
observation that Diaz had been able to perform his regular duties 
upon his return to the job. lol 
Knee injuries have not been found to place an individual under 
the protection of the Rehabilitation Act. In Elstner v. Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co. ,102 Elstner, a telephone company employee, whose 
duties included pole tree climbing, originally injured his knee at a 
softball game, and then after recovering, reinjured the same knee on 
the job. 103 Elstner underwent corrective knee surgery on several 
occasions. I04 Although after the initial surgery Elstner was able to 
resume his normal duties, successive operations prevented him from 
performing those duties. 10$ When Elstner applied for a hardship 
transfer,l06 he was transferred to a lower paying position.107 Elstner 
then brought suit claiming handicap discrimination. lOS The basis of 
Elstner's handicap discrimination claim was the company's Affir-
mative Action Plan,l09 which employed the Rehabilitation Act's re-
gulations' definition of a handicapped individual. lIo 
The court held that Elstner was not a handicapped individual 
merely because he was unable to perform a single job. 11I According 
to the court, Elstner did not fit within the Rehabilitation Act's 
definition because he was not a handicapped individual. 1I2 
In Alderson v. Postmaster General,1I3 Alderson, a USPS carrier, 
injured his knee after being chased by a dog. 1I4 After undergoing 
physical therapy, the treating physician concluded that Alderson's 
knee had regained full motion, and therefore, allowed Alderson to 
resume his daily work duties. lI$ Once Alderson was dismissed because 
of his alleged slowness in delivering mail, he brought suit under the 
Rehabilitation Act. 116 
In its opinion, the court stated that the treating physician's 
findings did not support the assertion that Alderson was handicapped 
100. [d. at 491-92. 
101. [d. 
102. 659 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aiI'd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988). 
103. [d. at 1332. 
104. [d. at 1332-33. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. at 1333. 
107. [d. at 1331. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. at 1341 n.l. 
110. [d. at 1341 n.2. 
111. [d. at 1343. 
112. [d. 
113. 598 F. Supp. 49 (W.O. Okla. 1984). 
114. [d. at 51-52. 
115. [d. at 52. 
116. [d. at 50. 
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for any period of time.1I7 Furthermore, the court held that there was 
no evidence that the USPS ever regarded Alderson as handicapped, llS 
thereby removing Alderson from inclusion under the third prong of 
the Rehabilitation Act's definition. 
Other conditions, such as left-handedness and body weight, have 
not been considered disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act. In de 
la Torres v. Bolger,ll9 de la Torres, a left-handed USPS carrier was 
dismissed from the USPS because of unsatisfactory slowness in 
delivering the mail. I20 De la Torres brought suit against the USPS 
alleging handicap discrimination. 121 The Fifth Circuit determined that 
de la Torres did not satisfy the firsi element of the definition of an 
individual with handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act: 122 Being left-
handed was "a physical characteristic, not a chronic illness, a disorder 
or deformity, a mental disability, or a condition affecting [de la 
Torres's] health."I23 
The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California reached a similar result in Tudyman v. United Airlines. l24 
Tudyman, a male bodybuilder, applied for a position as a flight 
attendant with United Airlines and was subsequently denied employ-
ment. 125 At the time of his application, Tudyman weighed 178 
pounds. 126 United Airlines required that flight attendants with Tud-
yman's height of five foot, seven inches, weigh no more than 163 
pounds. 127 Tudyman filed suit against ... United Airlines claiming hand-
icap discrimination,128 
The court held that Tudyman was not a handicapped individual 
under the Rehabilitation ACt because he failed to satisfy any of the 
definition's elements. 129 The court stated that Tudyman was not 
physically impaired because his unique body composition was self-
imposed and voluntary,l3o Nor, according to the court, did his body 
117. [d. at 53. 
118. [d. 
119. 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
120. [d. at 1135. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. at 1137. 
123. [d. at 1138. 
124. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal,. 1984). 
125. [d. at 740. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. at 743-47. 
130. [d. at 746. The court distinguished a "voluntary" weight gain from an 
"involuntary" weight gain such as one caused by a glandular problem. [d. 
Therefore, the court implied that an "involuntary" weight gain might bring 
an individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. [d. 
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weight limit the major life activity of working; he was only prevented 
from working as a flight attendant. 131 Finally, the court noted that 
United Airlines neither perceived nor regarded Tudyman as a hand-
iCapped individual. 132 
These federal decisions appear to indicate that persons afflicted 
with certain musculoskeletal impairments like· shoulder dislocations, 
spinal deformities, amputation, and dwarfism will be considered 
handicapped, while those persons dealing with knee injuries, left-
handedness or body weight problems will not be considered handi-
capped. The most acute conflict among the federal courts occurs 
where the impairment is related to an injury. or deformity afflicting 
a person's back. Generally, where the impairment to the back is 
severe, the federal courts will likely consider that condition to be 
handicapping in nature. 
2. Sensory Function Disabilities or Impairments 
Generally, the courts have held that deaf individuals meet the 
Rehabilitation Act's definition of individuals with handicaps.133 Sim-
ilarly, individuals who are blind or legally blind have been found to 
satisfy the Rehabilitation Act's definition of individuals with handi-
caps.l34 Likewise, . individuals, having vision in only one eye, have 
also been considered individuals with handicaps.13s 
131. [d. 
132. [d. 
133. See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(finding that a school bus driver, who wore a hearing aid, was a handicapped 
individual); Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding 
that a USPS employee, who had been completely deaf since birth, was a 
handicapped individual); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. 
Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (finding that a nursing school applicant, 
who had a moderately severe hearing loss in the right ear and a severe hearing 
loss in the left ear, was a handicapped individual). 
134. See Sharon v. Larson, 650 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that 
an applicant for a learner's permit, whose corrected vision in the right and 
left eyes was 20/120 and 20/300, respectively, was a handicapped individual); 
Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533, 536 (W.O. Ark. 1983) (finding that an 
applicant for a librarian position, whose corrected vision in the right eye was 
only 20/200 and whose left eye vision was unmeasurable, was a handicapped 
individual), a/I'd, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 
F. Supp. 982, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding that an applicant for a teaching 
position, who was blind since the age of 12, was a handicapped individual), 
a/I'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 932 (1981). 
135. See Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 n.7 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that 
two junior high school students, who each had vision in only one eye, fell 
under the Rehabilitation Act's definition of individuals with handicaps); Wright 
v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding that a 
university student, possessing vision in only one eye, was a handicapped 
individual). 
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A more extensive analysis, however, must be conducted if the 
vision impairment does not rise to the level of total blindness in at 
least one eye. For example, in Padilla v. City oj Topeka,136 the 
Supreme Court of Kansas held that a police officer applicant, having 
an uncorrected vision of 20150 in each eye but a corrected vision of 
20/20,137 was not a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation 
Act. 138 Although the court found that Padilla did possess a physical 
impairment, it stated that this impairment did not limit any of his 
life activities. 139 
Conversely, in Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Education 
Agency,l40 an applicant for a teaching position had mUltiple handi-
caps, including nocturnal epilepsy, dyslexia and left side hemiplegia 
due to cerebral palsy. 141 Because of the dyslexia, Fitzgerald was only 
able to read between a third and sixth grade level. I42 After the 
educational agency refused to hire him, Fitzgerald brought suit under 
the Rehabilitation Act.143 The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa held that Fitzgerald was a handicapped 
individual under the Rehabilitation Act. l44 Based upon these federal 
decisions, one can conclude that a person with sensory impairment, 
which cannot be adequately corrected, will likely be considered a 
handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act. 
3. Cardiovascular and Circulatory Disabilities or Impairments 
Within the federal district courts, cardiovascular and circulatory 
impairments have been considered handicapping conditions subjecting 
individuals to the protection of the Rehabilitation Act. In Bey v. 
Bolger,14S Bey, who had applied for a position as a distribution clerk 
with the USPS, was diagnosed as suffering from hypertension, cardiac 
enlargement, and an abnormal EKG.I46 Because of these conditions, 
the USPS refused to hire him.147 The United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that Bey was a 
136. 708 P.2d 543 (Kan. 1985). 
137. [d. at 545. 
138. [d. at 550. 
139. [d. 
140. 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984). 
141. [d. at 1132. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. 
144. [d. at 1135-36. See a/so Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 668 (lith Cir. 1983) 
(holding that an individual, who had been diagnosed as dyslexic, was a 
handicapped individual). 
145. 540 F. Supp. 910 (B.D. Pa. 1982). 
146. [d. at 920. 
147. [d. at 913. 
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handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act 
because (1) he had a "record of a physical impairment, cardiovascular 
disease;" and (2) the USPS "regarded him as handicapped because 
of his continuing uncontrolled blood pressure, cardiac enlargement 
and abnormal electrocardiogram." 148 
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland, in Carty v. Carlin,149 considered a situation where the 
USPS had taken discriminatory measures. Carty, a postal employee, 
was discharged from employment as a custodian by the USPS, after 
suffering a heart attack and being hospitalized for severe depres-
sion. lSo 
Focusing on the first prong of the Rehabilitation Act's definition, 
the court examined several factors to determine if an impairment is 
so severe as to substantially limit employment potential. The factors 
to be considered include "the number and type of jobs from which 
the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which 
the individual has a reasonable access, and the individual's job 
expectations and training. "lSI 
Applying these three factors, the court found that Carty had 
not demonstrated that the position of custodian was the only one he 
was incapable of performing. ls2 
The court then focused on the second prong of the definition 
and determined Carty had a physical and mental impairmentlS3 based 
on Carty's record of medical and psychiatric treatment. lS4 Therefore, 
the court held that it could not state that Carty did not meet the 
definition of a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act.1SS 
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island 
analyzed the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handiCapped indi-
vidual in Bento v. I. T. O. Corp. of Rhode Island. ls6 Bento, a long-
shoreman, suffered a back injury at work.ls7 While receiving workers' . 
compensation benefits, he suffered chest pains which precipitated an 
emergency room visit. IS8 After admittance to the hospital, it was 
discovered that he had only two major coronary arteries instead of 
the normal three. IS9 Open heart surgery was successfully performed, 
148. [d. at 927. 
149. 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985). 
150. [d. at 1183. 
151. [d. at 1185. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. at 1184. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. at 1185. 
156. 599 F. Supp. 731 (D.R.!. 1984). 
157. [d. at 733. 
158. [d. at 734. 
159. [d. 
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and Bento received disability benefits for the next two years. l60 
Although eager to return to work, Bento was denied employment by 
. the defendant, I.T.O. Corporation.l61 Relying upon the language of 
the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that Bento was a handicapped 
person 162 because he suffered from a "documented physical impair-
ment which substantially limit[ed] some of his major life activities. "163 
Minor to moderate circulatory impairments have not been af-
forded the protection of the Rehabilitation Act by the Eighth Circuit. 
In Oesterling v. Waiters,l64 Oesterling, a Veterans Administration 
clerk/typist, was reassigned to a mailclerk position. 16s Oesterling 
objected to this reassignment on the ground that leg problems as-
sociated with varicose veins would prevent her from standing or 
walking for long periods of time. 166 After her application for disability 
retirement was denied, Oesterling filed suit alleging a violation of 
the Rehabilitation Act. 167 . 
The Eighth Circuit viewed the question of whether a person is 
a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation 
Act as one of fact. l68 The court compared Oesterling's facts against 
the first prong of the definition. 169 Although the court found that 
she had a physical impairment from varicose veins, her condition 
had been diagnosed as mild to moderate. 17o The court concluded the 
major life activities of standing and sitting were not substantially 
limited as a result of this impairment. 171 Therefore, the court held 
that Oesterling was not a handicapped individual under the Rehabil-
itation Act. 172 
4. Other Physical Impairments 
When an individual suffers from a kidney impairment, whether 
as the sole disabling condition or in conjunction with other ailments, 
the courts have found that the individual is handicapped within the 
160. [d. 
161. [d. at 735-36. 
162. [d. at 741. 
163. [d. See also Cook v. United States Dep't of Labor, 688 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 
1982) (finding that the plaintiff, who suffered from angina, was a handicapped 
individual because he was regarded as having an impairment which substantially 
limited his life activities), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983). 
164. 760 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1985). 
165. [d. at 860. 
166. [d. at 860-61. 
167. [d. at 860. 
168. [d. at 861. 
169. [d. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. 
172. [d. 
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meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 173 Additionally, the courts have 
generally held that individuals who suffer from diabetes are handi-
capped individuals under the Rehabilitation Act. 114 
In Vickers v. Veterans Administration,11S a government em-
ployee, Vickers, brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming 
he was a handicapped person because he was sensitive to tobacco 
smoke. 116 The court found that Vickers had a physical impairment 
which substantially limited one or more of his major life activities, 
in particular his capacity to work in an environment which was not 
completely smoke free. 111 Therefore, the court held that Vickers was 
a handicapped person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 118 
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia declined to find an Army employee handicapped 
under the Rehabilitation Act in Stevens v. Stubbs. 119 Stevens was 
downgraded from a vehicle operations manager position to a ware-
houseman. lso Stevens brought suit on several grounds, alleging in one 
count. that he was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act. 181 
Although Stevens had taken extensive leaves of absence,182 he failed 
to present any evidence of a specific "physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limit[ed] one or more of his major life activi-
ties."183 According to the court, the only evidence that Stevens 
produced was an "undisclosed transitory illness." 184 Furthermore, the 
court did not accept Stevens' argument that he was regarded by his 
employer as having an impairment since the record was totally devoid 
of any such evidence.18s Therefore, since Stevens could not ~stablish 
he suffered from any physical or mental impairment, or that he was 
regarded by his employer as having an impairment, the court held 
173. See Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 425 (E.D. Pa. 
1982) (concluding that a high school student, who had a kidney removed, was 
a handicapped individual); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. 
Supp. 948, 953 (D.N.J. 1980) (concluding that a high school student, who was 
born with one kidney, was considered a handicapped individual). 
174. See, e.g., Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(finding that an applicant for a sanitation worker position, who was medically 
disqualified because he suffered from diabetes mellitus, was handicapped under 
the Rehabilitation Act), aJJ'd, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989). 
175. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.O. Wash. 1982). 
176. [d. at 87-88. 
177. [d. at 86-87. 
178. [d. at 86. 
179. 576 F.Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
180. [d. at 1410. 
181. [d. at 1413. 
182. [d. 
183. [d. at 1414. 
184. [d. 
185. [d. 
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that he was not a handicapped person within the meaning of the 
Rehabilitation Act. 186 
5. Neurological Disorders 
The courts have consistently found epilepsy to be a disability, 187 
even in situations where the individual has not suffered an epileptic 
attack for a long time. 188 For example, in Duran v. City of Tampa, 189 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
determined 'that a police applicant satisfied the third prong of the 
definition of handicapped,19O although he did not experience any 
grand or petit mal seizures for fifteen years or take medication for 
ten years. 191 
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Brock,l92 a former government em-
ployee, suffering from epileptic seizures, was considered a handi-
capped individual under the Rehabilitation ACt. 193 The court based 
its holding on the first prong of the definition.l94 The court deter-
mined that Reynolds' epilepsy substantially limited her ability to 
work because both "federal and state regulations and policies re-
strict[edj the types of jobs available to her. "195 For example, many 
states prohibit epileptics from obtaining driver's licenses unless they 
have not suffered a seizure for a specific length of time. l96 The court 
found that this inability to drive to work severely limited job op-
portunities for epileptics and, therefore, held in Reynolds' favor .197 
186. [d. at 1415. 
187. See Salmon Pineiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483,490 (D.P.R. 1987) (finding 
that plaintiff suffered a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act because of 
extensive history of "convulsive episodes"); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area 
Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Iowa 1984) ("[P]laintiff has 
nocturnal epilepsy, dyslexia and cerebral palsy with left side hemiplegia. There 
appears to be no dispute that plaintiff is a 'handicapped individual."'); Drennon 
v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("That 
persons with epilepsy are considered handicapped is too self-evident to be 
contested. "). 
188. This view is consistent with the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines which state that 
"an individual with epilepsy would be considered to have an impairment even 
. if the symptoms of the disorder were completely controlled by medicine." 56 
Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991). 
189. 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977). 
190. [d. at 78. 
191. [d. at 76. 
192. 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987). 
193. [d. at 574. 
194. [d. at 573-74. 
195. [d. at 574. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. 
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Cerebral palsy, on the other hand, has not met with much 
success in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio.J98 In Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Society,l99 Pridemore 
was denied employment as an attorney. 200 Analyzing the facts based 
upon all three prongs of the Rehabilitation Act's definition, the court 
held that Pridemore could not establish a prima facie case of handicap 
discrimination.201 According to the court, the impact of cerebral palsy 
caused Pridemore to have poor control over his ocular muscles, 
thereby limiting his ability to read and to sustain eye contact. 202 
Furthermore, Pridemore suffered from speech defects, although his 
speech could be understood by listeners.203 
The court concluded that Pridemore was not a handicapped 
individual under the Rehabilitation Act because the cerebral palsy 
did not substantially limit any of Pridemore's major life activities.204 
Further, Pridemore did not have a record of an impairment because 
his cerebral palsy was diagnosed after he had applied for the job.20S 
Finally, the court found Pridemore did not create a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the third prong of the definition206 because 
he did not mention he had cerebral palsy during the interview 
process.207 
With respect to individuals diagnosed with mUltiple sclerosis, 
courts have generally found that these individuals are handicapped 
under the Rehabilitation Act. 208 For example, in Carter v. Casa 
Central,209 a director of nursing was dismissed after being diagnosed 
with multiple sclerosis.2lO The defendant conceded at trial that Carter 
was a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act.2I1 
198. Contra Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. lBO, 
1132 (S;D. Iowa 1984) (finding that a school teacher, whose most apparent 
handicap was left side hemiplegia due to cerebral palsy, was a handicapped 
individual). 
199. 625 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
200. [d. at 1182. 
201. [d. at 1185. 
202. [d. at 1183. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. at 1184. 
205. [d. 
206. [d. at 1185. 
207. [d. at 1184. 
208. "Multiple sclerosis is a disease that affects the central nervous system, that is 
the brain and spinal cord." Carter v. Casa Central, 849 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.l 
(7th Cir. 1988). This condition can cause individuals to be totally incapacitated, 
or cause only intermittent periods of weakness, or other neurological loss of 
function. [d. 
209. 849 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988). 
210. [d. at 1054. 
211. [d. at 1051. Accord Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F .2d 1372, 
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6. Respiratory Ailments 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania has addressed the relationship between respiratory ail-
ments and individuals with handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act. 212 
In Fynes v. Weinberger,213 the court concluded that two navy yard 
employees, who suffered from asbestosis or asbestos-related diseases, 
were handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.214 
7. Contagious Diseases 
In addition to the Supreme Court's decision in Arline, other 
courts have held that an individual suffering from a contagious 
disease is a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act. For 
instance, in Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center,21S the court held 
that an applicant, seeking admission into the Woodhaven Learning 
Center, and who was diagnosed as being an active carrier of Hepatitis 
B,216 was a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Re-
habilitation Act. 217 The court focused on the third. prong of the 
definition and determined· that Kohl was "regarded as having a 
physical impairment" as a result of carrying Hepatitis B.218 According 
to the court, the denial of admission to Kohl by Woodhaven Learning 
Center and Woodhaven School limited one of Kohl's major life 
activities.219 The court then stated that this denial was primarily a 
result of the belief by both facilities that Kohl's condition posed a 
1376 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that a medical doctor, who suffered from 
multiple sclerosis, was confined to a wheelchair, and had difficulty writing, 
was a handicapped person). 
212. Fynes v. Weinberger, 677 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
213. 677 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
214. Id. at 321; see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. 
215. 672 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D"Mo. 1987), rev'd, 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 V.S. 892 (1989). The Eighth Circuit accepted the district court's 
finding that Kohl was handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation 
Act. Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 865 F.2d 930, 935 (8th Cir.) , cert. 
denied, 493 V.S. 892 (1989). The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district 
court's application of the Arline test in two ways. Id. at 937. 
First, the district court commingled the two parts of the test, analyzing 
• the nature of the risk to others only after assuming its recommended 
accommodations were in place. Second, the district court paid un-
warranted deference to the opinion of a particular health official as 
to what accommodations were reasonable. 
Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court order granting injunctive and 
declaratory relief to Kohl. Id. at 941. 
216. Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 672 F. Supp. at 1222. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
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threat to third persons within the facility.220 Under this third prong, 
the court had little difficulty finding that Kohl was a handicapped 
individual.221 
By expressly stating that individuals that are HIV positive are 
included within the meaning of disability under the ADA,222 Congress 
left no room for judicial decision-making in this area. Nevertheless, 
under the Rehabilitation Act, the courts generally have held that 
persons with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 
were handicapped individuals. 223 
8. Mental or Psychological Disorders or Impairments 
The courts have generally held that individuals who are mentally 
retarded are handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation 
Act.224 Other more subtle mental or psychological disorders/impair-
ments have not resulted in the same unanimity in the courts. The 
Second and Fifth Circuits, as well as the United States District Courts 
for the District of Columbia, the Southern District of Ohio, and the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, have found that mental and/or 
physical disorders are encompassed by the Rehabilitation Act's def-
inition. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has declined to hold that the 
psychological disorder of acrophobia falls within the meaning of 
handicapped individual as used in the statute. 
In Doe v. New York University,22S the Second Circuit decided if 
a medical student, who suffered from psychiatric and mental disor-
ders, was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act.226 Doe was 
diagnosed as having a borderline personality disorder. 227 Her behavior 
220. [d. 
221. [d. 
222. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
223. See Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 1002, 
1007 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (concluding that a child, who suffered from hemophilia 
B and was diagnosed as having an AIDS-related complex, was a handicapped 
individual); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that a five year old boy infected with the AIDS virus 
was a handicapped individual); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of 
Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (finding that children with 
AIDS are handicapped individuals). 
224. See Flowers v. Webb, 575 F. Supp. 1450, 1456 (B.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that 
a 19 year old mentally retarded girl, who brought suit against the State 
Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and 
Developmental Disabilities, had demonstrated that she was handicapped under 
the Rehabilitation Act). 
225. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981). 
226. -[d. at 774-75. 
227. [d. at 768. A personality disorder is a serious condition which manifests itself 
by a series of five or more recognizable characteristics. [d. The court reasoned 
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consisted of numerous self-destructive acts as well as attacks upon 
other individuals.228 These attacks were followed by both psycholog-
ical treatments and admissions to various psychiatric hospitals. 229 The 
court concluded that Doe should be classified as a handicapped 
person under the Rehabilitation Act230 because of her extensive history 
of mental impairments requiring hospitalizations.231 According to the 
court, this history indicated that Doe suffered from a substantial 
limitation on a major life activity-"the ability to handle stressful 
situations of the type faced in a medical training milieu. "232 Fur-
thermore, "New York University's refusal to readmit her on the 
ground that she posed an unacceptable risk to faculty, students, and 
patients made it clear that she was to be regarded as having such an 
impairment. "233 
The Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental 
Retardation Commission,234 considered the situation where a psychi-
atric worker brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act after her 
employment was terminated.23S Doe had been diagnosed as suffering 
from a "depressive neurosis. "236 Additionally she suffered from 
chronic insomnia and serious depression. 237 Her illness became so 
acute that she had to be hospitalized several times.238 After her release 
from the hospital, she continued psychiatric treatment. 239 Shortly 
after expressing a wish to commit suicide, her employer discovered 
her medical history and terminated her employment. 240 The court, 
therefore, concluded that a mental handicap, such as that claimed 
by Doe, qualified under the Rehabilitation Act.241 
as follows: 
Id. 
A person suffering from this type of disorder is likely to have it 
continue throughout most of his or her adult life, subject to modifi-
cation only by treatment by well-trained therapists over a period of 
years and adoption of a iifestyle which avoids situations that subject 
the person to types of stress with which he or she cannot cope. 
228. Id. at 766. 
229. Id .. 
230. Id. at 775. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983). 
235. Id. at 1407. 
236. Id. at 1404. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 1405. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 1406-07. 
241. Id. at 1408. 
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Similarly, in Matzo v. Postmaster General,242 a secretary, Matzo, 
employed by the USPS, brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act 
when her employment was terminated because of repeated absences.243 
Matzo claimed she was a handicapped person because she was a 
manic depressive. 244 She suffered' from emotional problems and her 
behavior at work was erratic, disruptive, and insubordinate.245 The 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
although the USPS had not disputed that Matzo's mental condition 
qualified her as a handicapped person within the meaning of the 
Rehabilitation Act,246 the USPS had proved that Matzo was not 
"otherwise qualified," and that the USPS had made reasonable 
accommodations.247 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio confronted similar discrimination by the USPS in Franklin v. 
United States Postal Service.248 Franklin, an USPS employee, was 
terminated and subsequently brought suit under the Rehabilitation 
Act.249 Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and was fre-
quently hospitalized for this illness.250 Working under the first prong 
of the definition, the court determined that Franklin's condition 
"may place [Franklin] in the handicapped category."251 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania also considered schizophrenic reactions in light of the 
Rehabilitation Act in Doe v. Colautti.252 Doe, an inmate in a private 
psychiatric hospital, brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act. 253 Doe 
was referred to the Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital following a 
suicide attempt,254 and was diagnosed as suffering from a "schizoaf-
fective reaction. "255 The court held that the "plaintiff unquestionably 
[was] a 'handicapped individual' within the meaning of [the Reha-
bilitation Act]. "256 
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit found that an individual suffering 
from acrophobia fell outside of the Rehabilitation Act's protection. 
242. 685 F. Supp. 260 (D.D.C. 1987), a/I'd, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
243. [d. at 261. 
244. [d. 
245. [d. 
246. [d. at 262 n.4. 
247. [d. at 264. 
248. 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988). 
249. [d. at 1215-16. 
250. [d. at 1216. 
251. [d. at 1218. 
252. 454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978), a/I'd, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979). 
253. [d. at 624. . 
254. [d. at 625. 
255. [d. 
256. [d. at 626. 
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In Forrisi v. Bowen,2S7 Forrisi was hired by the Department of Health 
and Human Services ("DHHS") as a utility systems repairer and 
operator.258 The job description required Forrisi to climb stairways 
and ladders both for emergencies and for routine maintenance.259 
Because Forrisi suffered from acrophobia, he was unable to climb 
to certain heights. 260 Consequently, the DHHS terminated Forrisi's 
employment. 261 
Working under the first prong of the definition, the court 
examined whether Forrisi's impairment constituted a significant bar-
rier to employment. 262 The court listed three factors that were relevant 
to this type of inquiry: "[T]he number and type of jobs from which 
the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which 
the individual has reasonable access, and the individual's job expec-
tations and training. "263 The court determined. that Forrisi did not 
fall under the first prong of the definition because his particular 
impairment prevented him from occupying only one position in his 
place of employment. 264 The court stated that a substantial limitation 
to working occurs when the employee's impairment generally fore-
closes the type of employment involved and not just one specific 
position.265 
The court also rejected Forrisi's second argument that he was 
perceived as having an impairment.266 The court stated that the DHHS 
terminated Forrisi because he was. unable to perform the functions 
of one single position and not because the DHHS considered Forrisi 
to be handicapped.261 
The Rehabilitation Act decisions encompass a wide array of 
conditions and impairments. Even more varied are the analyses 
employed by the courts when deciding if a given individual satisfies 
the definition of individual with handicaps .. One common thread, 
however, ties all of these decisions together: Handicapping conditions 
fall within one of two categories. The first category contains those 
conditions, like mental retardation, Ahat either because of their se-
verity or their effect, qualify a person as an individual with a 
handicap. The second category encompasses those persons suffering 
257. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986). 
258. [d. at 933. 
259. [d. 
260. [d. 
261. [d. 
262. [d. 
263. [d. (citing Jasany v. United States, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985». 
264. [d. at 934. 
265. [d. at 935. 
266. [d. at 934. 
267. [d. at 935. 
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from other conditions that do not fit neatly within the Rehabilitation 
Act's definition. In this group, each person suffering must individ-
ually demonstrate that he or she qualifies as an individual with 
handicaps. As the decisions in this second category indicate, the 
success of a claim often depends on how well the claimant has met 
his or her burden of production. Unfortunately, relying upon Re-
habilitation Act decisions in this second category to serve as the 
benchmark for future ADA disability decisions proves problematic. 
v. ANALYSIS OF THE ADA DEFINITION 
By examining the Rehabilitation Act decisions and the EEOC 
regulations, a better understanding of the ADA definition of disability 
can be gained. Organizationally, this section discusses each prong of 
the ADA separately. 
A. The First Prong: HA Physical or Mental Impairment that 
Substantially Limits One or More oj the Major Life Activities oj 
Such Individual" 
1. Physical Impairment 
Several federal courts have found that an individual was physi-
cally impaired under the first prong of the Rehabilitation Act. 268 
Examples of conditions which were determined to be physical im-
pairments include blindness,269 deafness,270 mUltiple sclerosis,271 epi-
lepsy,272 and dwarfism. 273 One can logically conclude, therefore, that 
these same physical impairments would be found to meet the defi-
nition of disability under the ADA. 
Conversely, some courts have determined that certain physical 
conditions did not meet the definition of a handicapped individual 
under the first prong.274 In de la Torres, for example, the court 
determined that left-handedness was "a physical characteristic, not 
a chronic illness, a disorder or deformity, a mental disability, or a 
condition affecting [the plaintiff's] health. "27S Nor has body weight 
been considered a handicapping condition when it is self-imposed 
and voluntary. 276 
268. See supra notes 37-43, 81-93, 156-63 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
27l. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text. 
272. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra notes 102-32 and accompanying text. 
275. de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
276. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
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The ADA's legislative history277 and its EEOC regulations278 
would render these prior decisions consistent with the ADA's defi-
nition of disability. The House Committee on the Judiciary states: 
[A] physical or mental impairment means: 
[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the 
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, spe-
cial sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs, car-
diovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic 
and lymphatic; skin, and endocrine. 
Physical or· mental impairment does not include simple 
physical characteristics, such as blue eyes or black hair. 279 
2. Mental Impairment 
Several courts have determined that various mental conditions 
fall within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act.280 For example, in 
New York University, a medical student who suffered from psychi-
atric and mental disorders, which caused her to commit self-destruc-
tive acts, was considered a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation 
Act. 281 Individuals diagnosed with the following types of mental 
conditions also met the definition of mental impairment: mental 
retardation;282 schizoaffective reaction, which caused the individual 
to become suicidal;283 depressive neurosis, which caused the individual 
to be hospitalized several times;284 manic depression, which caused 
the individual to suffer from emotional problems and whose behavior 
was erratic;28S and paranoid schizophrenia, which caused the individ-
ual to be frequently hospitalized.286 
277. A physical or mental impairment means-
1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, in-
cluding speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-
urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; .... 
S. REp. No. 116, supra note 9, at 22; see also H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II, 
supra note II, at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 333. 
278. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g), 1630.3 (1993). 
279. [d. § 1630.2; see also H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. III, supra note 11, at 28, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 451. 
280. See supra notes 225-55 and accompanying text. 
281. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981). 
282. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text. 
285. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra notes 247-55 and accompanying text. 
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These courts' interpretations of the term mental impairment are 
also consistent with the ADA's legislative history and the EEOC 
regulations. Both the House of Representatives Committee on the 
JudiCiary Report and the EEOC regulations state that "mental im-
pairment ... means ... any mental or psychological disorder, such 
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental 
illness, and specific learning disabilities. "287 
3. Substantially Limits One or More of Life's Major Activities 
The phrase "substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of an individual" was extensively scrutinized under the 
Rehabilitation Act's case law. Some physical and mental impair-
ments were found per se to limit substantially a major life activity. 288 
Examples of these types of physical impairments include blindness, 
the major life activity of seeing;289 deafness, the major life activity 
of hearing;290 and AIDS, the major life activity of procreation and 
intimate sexual relationships. 291 
Other physical and mental impairments, however, had to be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine the extent of the 
limitation upon an individual's life. For example, in Arline, the 
Supreme Court found that the physical impairment of tuberculosis 
substantially limited the major life activity of breathing.292 Back 
problems causing extreme pain were determined to limit the major 
life activities of working, walking, sitting, and standing, in Perez.293 
Conversely, other physical impairments were found not to limit 
a major life activity. In Jasany, the court determined that the physical 
impairment of crossed eyes did not substantially limit Jasany's life 
because he was able to participate fully in "school, work, sports, 
and recreational activities."294 In Oesterling, the court determined 
that varicose veins, although a physical impairment, did not substan-
tially limit Oesterling's life because the condition was diagnosed as 
mild to moderate. 29s The court, therefore, concluded that th:e major 
287. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h)(2); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. III, supra note 11, at 28, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 450. 
288. See supra notes 133-35, 187-88, 223-24 and accompanying text . 
. 289. See supra notes 134-35. 
290. See supra note 133. 
291. H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II, supra note 11, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 334; cj. Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. 
Supp. 1002, 1007 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that an elementary school student 
with an AIDS-related complex was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act). 
292. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987). 
293. Perez v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1987); 
a/I'd, 841 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1988). 
294. Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985). 
295. Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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life activities of standing and sitting were not substantially limited.296 
The ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations are 
consistent with these courts' interpretations of this term under the 
Rehabilitation Act. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources states the following: 
A physical or mental impairment does not constitute a 
disability under the first prong of the definition for purposes 
of the ADA unless its severity is such that it results in a 
"substantial limitation of one or more major life activities. " 
A "major life activity" means functions such as caring for 
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.297 
The EEOC regulations interpret the term substantially limits to 
mean: 
(1) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average 
person in the general population can perform; or 
(2) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which an individual can perform a particular 
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, 
or duration under which the average person in the general 
popUlation can perform that same major life activity. 298 
The legislative history and the EEOC regulations would appear, 
therefore, to validate the courts' conclusions in Arline, Jasany, Perez, 
and Oesterling. -
B. The Second Prong: "A Record of Such Impairment" 
Although fewer in number, the cases that have analyzed this 
prong of the definition generally performed a more extensive analysis 
than the cases under the first prong. Two of the three leading cases, 
Arline and E. E. Black, examined their sets of facts against this 
prong. In Arline, the Supreme Court determined that Arline had a 
record of an impairment because she had been hospitalized for 
tuberculosis.299 Her medical history thus provided a sufficient record 
to meet this prong. 3OO In E. E. Black, the plaintiff, Crosby, suffered 
back injuries on the job.301 After undergoing a medical pre-employ-
ment examination that revealed the back injuries, the defendant, E. 
296. [d. 
297. S. REp. No. 116, supra note 9, at 22 (emphasis added). 
298. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1993). 
299. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987). 
300. [d. 
301. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (D. Haw. 1980). 
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E. Black, refused to hire Crosby.302 The court determined that Crosby 
had a record (the physical examination) of a physical impairment 
(back injuries) and that this record substantially limited his employ-
ment opportunities. 303 
Other cases which have reached similar results include Mental 
Health-Mental Retardation Commission, in which a record of a 
mental impairment was one of the primary reasons behind the 
employer's decision to terminate the claimant's employment,304 and 
New York University, in which the court concluded that the claimant 
should be classified as a handicapped person because of her extensive 
history of mental impairments requiring hospitalizations. 30s 
A contrary result was reached by the Pridemore court. In Pride-
more, an applicant for an attorney position, who suffered from 
cerebral palsy, was determined not to have a record of an impairment 
because the cerebral palsy was diagnosed after his job interview.306 
Thus, Pridemore did not have a record of an impairment at the time 
the employment decision was made.307 
The ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations are 
consistent with the courts' interpretations of this term. The House 
of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor reported: 
The second prong of the definition of the term "disability" 
includes an individual who has a record of such impairment, 
i.e., an individual who has a history of, or has been mis-
classified as having, a mental or physical impairment- that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities. 
This provision is included in the definition in part to 
protect individuals who have recovered from a physical or 
mental impairment which previously substantially limited 
them in a major life activity. Discrimination on the basis 
of such a past impairment would be prohibited under this 
legislation.308 
The EEOC regulations state: "Has a record of such impairment 
means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental 
302. [d. 
303. [d. at 1098. 
304. Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm., 704 F.2d 1402, 
1406-07 (5th Cir. 1983). 
305. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981). 
306. Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Soc'y, 625 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 
1985). . 
307. [d. 
308. H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II, supra note 11, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 334. 
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or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities. "309 
Both the ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations 
would agree with the courts' interpretations of this term. This prong, 
thus, intends to cover two types of individuals: (1) Those individuals 
who are discriminated against because they have a record of an 
impairment, such as individuals with histories of mental or emotional 
illness; and (2) those individuals who have been misclassified as 
having an impairment, such as an individual being falsely diagnosed 
as mentally retarded.3lD 
C. The Third Prong: "Being Regarded as Having Such an 
Impairment" 
In many ways, this prong is the most difficult one to satisfy. 
However, as E. E. Black, Thornhill, and New York University 
demonstrate, proving a disability under this prong is possible. In 
E.E. Black, Crosby, an apprentice carpenter, suffered back injuries.311 
He was subsequently permitted by an examining physician to return 
to work.312 The contractor, however, refused to hire Crosby because 
it perceived that Crosby's back injuries made him disabled.313 The 
court determined that Crosby was an individual with handicaps under 
the third prong of the definition because the contractor regarded 
Crosby as impaired.314 
In Thornhill, the Army Corps of Engineers refused to hire the 
plaintiff in spite of two physicians concluding that the plaintiff's 
spinal deformity did not limit his lifting capacity.m The court held 
that there were sufficient material facts to find that Thornhill was a 
handicapped individual because of the Corps' perception that Thorn-
hill's spinal deformity prevented him from performing his duties.316 
In New York University, a medical student whose studies were 
terminated because she suffered from psychiatric and mental disorders 
was held to be a handicapped individual. 317 The court based its 
reasoning upon "NYU's refusal to readmit her on the ground that 
she pose[d] an unacceptable risk to faculty, students, and patients."318 
309. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1993). 
310. S. REp. No. 116, supra note 9, at 23. 
311. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (D. Haw. 1980). 
312. [d. at 1091-92. 
313. [d. at 1102. 
314. [d. 
315. Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
316. [d. at 1184. 
317. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981). 
318. [d. 
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Therefore, the court concluded that she was regarded as having an 
impairment. 319 
Both the ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations 
would render these interpretations consistent with the statute. The 
House Representatives Committee on the Judiciary states: 
This test is intended to cover persons who are treated by a 
covered entity as having a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity. It applies 
whether or not a person has an impairment, if that person 
was treated as if he or she had an impairment that substan-
tially limits a major life activity.320 
The EEOC Regulations state the following: 
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not 
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a 
covered entity as constituting such limitation; 
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes 
of others toward such impairment; or 
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs 
(h)(I) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity 
as having a substantially limiting impairment.321 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When deciding if a particular individual falls within the protec-
tion of the ADA, the courts will likely consider both the Rehabili-
tation Act decisions and the EEOC regulations. Although predicting 
which disabilities will meet the ADA's definition is somewhat spec-
ulative, the courts will not likely try to reinvent the wheel. Therefore, 
one would expect many of the same impairments that have met the 
Rehabilitation AcCs definition to also meet the ADA's definition. 
As the courts begin to create a comprehensive definition of disability, 
one would hope that they keep in mind the overriding purpose of 
the ADA and opt for a liberal construction. Inclusion is preferred 
over exclusion, just as the elimination of discrimination is preferred 
over its persistence. 
Amalia Magdalena Villalba322 
319. [d. 
320. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. III, supra note II, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 452. 
321. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1993). 
322. This Comment is dedicated to my daughter, Heather, who taught me that a 
deaf person can do anything except hear. 
